The Battle of Kale was a battle fought between the Macedonian general Balakros and the Achaemenid Satrap of Armenia Polemon's army in northern Anatolia in February 333 BC during Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire. The Macedonians assaulted an Armenian fortified camp and nearly destroyed the trapped Armenian army, removing the northern threat to Daskyleion.
History[]
In 334 BC, as Alexander the Great and his general Crios conquered central and southern Anatolia from the Achaemenid Persians, the Macedonian general Balakros raised an army in Daskyleion with the objective of conquering Pontus from the Satrapy of Cappadocia. His army recruited from the countryside to the east of Daskyleion, giving the Persians time to attempt a counterattack. The Persian Satrap of Armenia, Polemon, marched an army of 4,195 troops west from the Armenian Highlands to confront the Macedonians as they marched east. Polemon established a fortified camp at Kale (Alapli) in the early weeks of 333 BC, forcing Balakros to attack his army if he wished to march along the northern Anatolian coast. The Armenian army also posed a threat to Alexander's army in the south, as Polemon had the potential to join Darius III and Ariarathes' Persian armies near Gordion.
Battle[]
Dispositions[]
The Armenian garrison of Kale
The 3,532-strong Macedonian army of Balakros attacked the Armenians' fortified camp at Kale in February, finding that Polemon and his army had holed up inside the fortress and intended to remain behind its walls. Balakros' army consisted of his 200 elite cavalry bodyguards from the "Sacred Squadron", 256 Chalybean spearmen, 200 Thracian swordsmen, 300 Pontic levies, 900 Paphlagonian mercenary spearmen, 400 Greek hypaspist spearmen, 313 Thracian mercenary peltasts, 350 Greek javelinmen, 175 Pontic archers, 120 Greek sarissa lancers, and 118 Paphlagonian cavalry, reflecting the diversity of Alexander's growing empire. The Armenian army consisted mostly of Armenian spearmen and javelinmen, plus sizeable contingents of Phrygian axemen.
The Armenian fortified camp at Kale
Balakros' initial assessment of the situation was that the Armenians had placed most of their soldiers at the front gate of the fortified camp, while the gates on the right and rear of the fortress were apparently unprotected, and the Armenians had neglected to build a gate on the left side of their fortress. Balakros' initial plan was to mount a three-pronged attack on the camp, with the inexperienced Paphlagonian spearmen serving as his army's "forlorn hope" (high-casualty vanguard) and his more experienced Greek, Macedonian, and Thracian infantry and cavalry attacking through the unprotected entrances and shutting the larger Armenian force into a palisaded death trap.
However, further examination of the camp, made by Balakros' advance units, revealed that the right gate was also protected by Armenian troops, and that only the rear remained open as an avenue for a flank attack. Balakros proceeded with his original plan, dividing his army into three units, with his cavalry strike force planning to outflank the camp and attack from the rear entrance once his two infantry bodies had initiated the assault.
Battle at the gates[]
The Armenians attacking out of their camp
As the Macedonian forces approached the camp, however, Satrap Polemon ordered a large sortie against the Macedonian battle line which had formed at the main entrance to his camp. The attack was spearheaded by Armenian spearmen, plus some cavalry, although most of the Satrap's cavalry was held in reserve. The ensuing sortie was met with fierce resistance by the Macedonians, who outnumbered the portion of Polemon's army sent out to attack. In a bloody slaughter, the Macedonians gradually pushed the Armenians back towards the front gate of their camp, buying time for the other two Macedonian task forces to move into position at the other two gates.
The multi-pronged attack on the Armenian camp
The three Macedonian forces pushed into the camp, although the main body of Macedonians was held back at the gates, and the outnumbered Macedonian cavalry who had entered the base from the rear were met with overwhelming resistance. The Paphlagonian cavalrymen, who traditionally used their bows from a distance, were routed by an Armenian cavalry counterattack. The Macedonian spearmen on the right flank were also met with intense fightback from the Armenians, but, by then, the Armenian soldiers at the front gate were beginning to crumble. A domino effect ensued as the collapse of one Armenian formation enabled the Macedonians to bring even more overwhelming manpower to bear against the next Armenian unit, precipitating the disintegration of the whole Armenian army. Balakros had his army attempt to seal off the exits and kill or capture as many of the retreating Armenians as they could, but 1,153 Armenians - including Polemon himself - escaped the fiasco.
Aftermath[]
The Macedonian sarissa lancers riding down the fleeing Armenians
Polemon and the remnants of his Armenian army retreated from their camp in disarray, having lost three-quarters of their strength. The Macedonians, by comparison, had lost 1,205 troops, around a third of their strength. Despite his considerable losses, Balakros still had 2,327 troops against Polemon's 1,153 troops, and, after killing the 347 Armenians his army had taken prisoner (rather than ransom them back to the defeated Armenians or enslave them and risk facing a servile insurrection), Balakros' army pursued Polemon's army only a dozen miles up the road to Sinope and massacred them. Polemon's numbers had been reduced to 648 through desertions, and his entire force was wiped out, with only 129 surviving to be captured and then executed; Balakros lost a mere 120 men.
The dead at Kale
The consquences of the Armenian defeat at Kale were wide-ranging. Firstly, Armenia's satrap and the satrapy's main field army were lost in one fell swoop, depriving Armenia of the means to come to Darius III's aid as the Persian situation in Anatolia deteriorated. Secondly, the loss of an allied army rendered Sinope vulnerable to attack, forcing the Cappadocian satrap Labashi to move his battered armies north from Gordion to reinforce Sinope, reducing the number of Persian armies facing Alexander in the field. Thirdly, the battle led to Alexander placing Balakros in command of the operation to secure northern Anatolia and the Caucasus once he inevitably turned south to conquer Syria, as Balakros had proved himself with his first independent battlefield victory. The losses that Balakros had suffered, however, prevented him from immediately making a move against Sinope, and he was forced to withdraw to Macedonian-held territory to replenish his army's strength before risking another pitched battle.
Gallery[]
